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WHERE THERE'S A WILL THERE'S A WAY
SOME REFLECTIONS ON NATION-WIDE SERVICE OF
BANKRUPTCY PROCESS
ARTHUR JOHN KEEFF E, JOHN J. HOREY, KENNETH N. JOLLY
AND BARBER B. CONABLE, JR.
The world is flat. Such was the conclusion reached by thinkers a few
thousand years ago. Since a cursory glance at the horizon lent substance to
this conclusion it soon came to be gospel. It was accepted and repeated by
ancient geographers, and cartographers drew flat maps with elaborate
precipices over which the unwary sailor would disappear. Not until Magellan
sailed a circular course around a flat earth did the idea disappear.
Courts and writers today repeat, on faith alone, the words of others before
them who have said service of Chapter X process is limited to the territorial
boundaries of the district court. They seem to, feel that there exists at that
boundary another bottomless precipice beyond which such process dare not
venture. To reorganize nation-wide corporations nation-wide process is
needed. We believe there is a sound legal basis for such process today.
I. LEGAL BASIS FOR NATION-WIDE PROCESS
Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act was designed to provide a faster, cheaper,
and more effective system for the rehabilitation of tottering corporate finan-
cial structures than was provided under 77B or the equity receivership.'
When the House Judiciary Committee was conducting hearings on the present
Bankruptcy Act, Representative Chandler, sponsor of the bill, said:
"Now, let me say this, Mr. Chairman, the major portions of the first
11 sections are easily understood by reading the committee print. .. ."
One of these "easily understood" sections referred to by Mr. Chandler is
Section 2(a) (15) which provides:
"The courts of bankruptcy . . . are hereby invested . . . with jurisdic-
tion ... to-(15) make such orders, issue such process, and enter such
judgments in addition to those specifically provided for, as may be
necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this title. . .. ",
'One of the "provisions of this Act" is that the court shall "cause the estates
'H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).2Hearings before Committee on. Judiciary on H. R. 6439, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 16
(1937).
352 STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 11a (15) (Supp. 1946).
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of bankrupts -to be collected, reduced to money and distributed and deter-
mine controversies in relation thereto." 4 If this is to be done quickly, cheaply,
and effectively it should be done by one court. And a common sense inter-
pretation of Section 2(a) (15) seems to give a court power to issue nation-
wide process when necessary to "collect and distribute the estate of a bank-
rupt." Inasmuch as service of process is unrestricted, by the wording of
the Act, such an interpretation is reasonable.
The Supreme Court has not as yet expressly decided the question, but
the lower federal courts, with a single exception," have held process limited
to the territorial boundaries of .the district court. The reason generally given
is that the language of the Act is not explicit enough to warrant a departure
from the traditional geographical limitation of process. 7
H. THE AUsTRIAN CASE
The recent decision of Williams v. Auostria=8 points out that the Supreme
Court is willing to reexamine, in the light of practical need and Congressional
intent, the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.
Austrian brought an action in the Southern District of New York for the
recovery of corporate assets in his capacity as trustee of a Virginia corpora-
tion in reorganization in the. District Court in Virginia. Austrian was ap-
pointed by the Virginia court and to that court owed his authority to proceed
against the defendants, officers and directors of the corporation, accused of
defrauding the debtor corporation. The defendants, with the exception of
those not served, were residents of the Southern District of New York.
Jurisdiction was based, not on diversity of citizenship, but on the provisions
of Section 2 (a) (7) of the Bankruptcy Act, which creates courts of bank-
ruptcy and vests them with original jurisdiction ". . . to cause the estates of
452 STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 11 (7) (Supp. 1946).6Williams v. Austrian, 331 U. S. 642, 659, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443, 1452 (1947).0
"It is asserted by the defendants that the defendants are 'adverse claimants', that
defendants have not consented to this suit, and, under these circumstances, the juris-
diction of the court must be limited to the issuance of process within its local territorialjurisdiction, within the authority of Schumacier v. Beeler.... There seems to be no
case in which this precise question has been passed upon since sections 77A and 77B
were added to the Bankruptcy Law. If it were necessary to decide that question" here,
it would seem that the jurisdiction of the court must now necessarily extend to such
a suit, beyond the limits of section 23 of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U. S. C. A. § 46),
unless the purpose of Congress in enacting the reorganization provision is rendered
futile." Thomas v. Winslow, 11 F. Supp. 839, 841 (W. D. N. Y. 1935).7MooRE'S BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 498 (1939); FNLETTER, TEE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY
REORGANIZATION 175 (1939), citing Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, 268 U. S. 619,
622, 45 Sup. Ct. 621, 622 (1925).
8331 U. S. 642, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443 (1947).
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bankrupts to be collected . . . and to determine controversies in relation
thereto. . . ."9 The defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for want
of jurisdiction was granted by the District Court.' The reversal of the
Circuit Court of Appeals" was affirmed by the Supreme Court.12 This
decision resolved doubts which had arisen as a result of the exclusion of
Section 23 from the jurisdiction provisions of Chapter X. Section 23, which
determines jurisdiction to entertain plenary suits in liquidating bankruptcy,
limits the receiver's actions "only to the courts where the bankrupt might
have brought or prosecuted them." It was held that Section 2 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act is a broad grant of jurisdiction, summary and plenary, and that
Section 23 is a limiting rather than a granting section. 3 Earlier cases to
the contrary were rejected 14 and the decision was based on a case decided
in 18751 under the 1867 Bankruptcy Act.16
In the absence of an express statement of Congressional intent the Court
chose the interpretation which best conformed to the general purposes of
Chapter X.17 Since the purpose of Congress in altering 77B was to enhance
the functions of the trustee, little fault can be found with the Court's holding
that it was not the intention to limit the trustee in his choice of forum.
This decision is commendable. The reorganization trustee, with title to
952 STAT. 842 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 11 (7) (Supp. 1946).
1067 F. Supp. 223 (S. D. N. Y. 1946). This decision rested heavily on Bardes v.
Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S. 524, 20 Sup. Ct. 1000 (1900), and Schumacher v. Beeler,
293 U. S. 367, 55 Sup. Ct. 230 (1934), and consequently reached the conclusion that
§ 23 was not a limitation on any old powers of the district court, but rather a new
grant of jurisdiction. It was thought that more than the language of § 102 of the Act,
eliminating § 23 from Chapter X proceedings, was needed to accomplish so great a
change in a jurisdictional provision.
n159 F. 2d 67 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
12331 U. S. 642, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443 (1947).
13"... Congress intended by the elimination of § 23 to establish the jurisdiction of
federal courts to hear plenary suits brought by a reorganization trustee, even though
diversity or other usual ground for federal jurisdiction is lacking." 331 U. S. 642, 657,
67 Sup. Ct. 1443, 1450 (1947). "In any event, the construction of § 2, standing alone
and without regard for the influence of § 23, as being confined to summary matters rested
to a great extent upon a reading of Lathrop v. Drake, supra, with which, as has been
indicated, we cannot agree." 331 U. S. 642, 650, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443, 1447 (1947).
14 Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S. 524, 20 Sup. Ct. 1000 (1900); Schumacher
v. Beeler, 293 U. S. 367, 55 Sup. Ct. 230 (1934).
'
0 Lathrop v. Drake, 91 U. S. 516 (1875). See also Sherman v. Bingham, 21 Fed.
Cas. 1270, No. 12,762 (D. Mass. 1872), which expressly based upon the statutory pre-
decessor of § 2 the jurisdiction of the district courts to hear plenary suits.
1614 STAT. 517 (1867). § 1 of this 1867 Act is substantially the same as § 2 of the
present Act.
17 "The bill seeks to accomplish the following general purposes: .... (2) To increase
efficiency in administration. (3) To make clearer the provisions relative to the juris-
diction of the bankruptcy courts. (4) To improve the procedural sections of the Act.
... (10) ... In general, to modernize and bring up to date the bankruptcy law of our
country. H. R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937).
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the property and intimately acquainted with the facts, is the ideal person to
prosecute claims of the debtor.
III. PRIOR LAW AND PRESENT NEEDS
The next step in the development of a satisfactory reorganization pro-
cedure should be to allow the trustee to prosecute such claims in the district
where appointed. So far this has not been allowed.' 8 The leading case
denying the trustee this power is In re Standard Gas & Electric Conpaxmy.Y9
There, the plaintiff trustee filed a complaint in the District Court of Dela-
ware against fifty-six defendants. It was alleged that the defendants com-
bined to gain control of Standard Gas and used such control for their own
profit at the expense of the corporation. Service of process was made on
three defendants, residents of Delaware, in Delaware. Service on the other
fifty-three defendants, non-residents, was made outside the state. All defend-
ants appeared specially and moved to quash the service on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff argued that the action was authorized
by Section 77B(a) 20 of the Bankruptcy Act, which gave the Court "exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever located." The
service was quashed. It was held that since, under Section 23(b) of the
Bankruptcy Act, the corporation could not have sued the resident defend-
ants in the district court, the trustee could not. In regard to the non-residents
the court said that the cause of action while "property in a broad sense"
could only be prosecuted by a plenary suit and that extra-territorial service
of process was unauthorized in plenary suits.
Since the decision of the Standard Gas case, Congress expressly elimi-
nafed Section 23 from reorganization proceedings. 21 Thus, today, resident
defendants, in a plenary suit by a reorganization trustee, are deprived of the
jurisdictional objections upheld in the Standard Gas case.2
Even if we assume that jurisdiction of tfie debtor's property does not
allow extra-territorial service of process in plenary suits by reorganization
trustees, the question remains, does not Section 2(a) (15) specifically
authorize such service? This question was not raised or decided in the
Standard Gas case. Section 2(a) (15) authorizes courts of bankruptcy to
Isbn re Eastern Bankers Corporation, CCH BANIK. LAW SERv. (3d ed.) ff 53,967
(D. C. N. J. 1942); Clarke v. Fitch, CCH BANKR. LAW SERV. (3d ed.) II 53,805 (S. D.
N. Y. 1942) ; it re Standard Gas and Electric Co., 119 F. 2d 658 (C. C. A. 3d 1941);
Bovay v. Byllesby & Co., 88 F. 2d 990 (C. C. A. 5th 1937).
19 See note 18 supra.2049 STAT. 965 (1935), 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1935).
2152 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. 502 (1946).
22Williams v. Austrian, 331 U. S. 642, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443 (1947).
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"make such orders, issue,such process, and enter such judgments, in addi-
tion to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the enforce-
ment of the' provisions of this title: . . . ."" The principal case interpreting
this section is Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company v.
Chicago Rock Island and Pacific Railroad.24 It was held that a reorganiza-
tion court could issue an extra-territorial injunction to prevent the sale of
the debtor railroad's bonds held by the defendant banks as security for loans
made to the debtor. The Court discussed at length both Sections 2(a) (15)
and the provisions of Section 77 which give the reorganization court "exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property whereyer located."' 2
It would seem the Court felt that Section 2(a) (15)" alone would support
such an injunction. The language of the Court is interesting:
"The bankruptcy court, in granting the injunction, was well within
its power, either as a virtual court of equity, or under the broad provi-
sions of § 2(15) of the Bankruptcy Act or of § 262 of the judicial
Code."
2 6
It should be noted that Section 2(a) (15) is applicable in railroad reorgani-
zations (Section 77) as well as in other reorganizations. Furthermore, the
Rock Island proceeding was summary rather than plenary in nature. The
express statutory authorization for nation-wide process in railroad reorganiza-
tion was added to Section 77 after the Rock Island decision.2 7
Later cases have explained the Rock Island case on the basis that the
reorganization court's injunction was founded on jurisdiction over the prop-
erty of the debtor, regarding the equity of redemption in the security as
property. The "property concept" has been tortured to, bring cases within
such an interpretation although the interpretation itself has been questioned. 2
2352 STAT. 843 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. lla (15) (Supp. 1946).
24294 U. S. 648, 55 Sup. Ct. 595 (1935).
2 5
"Moreover, by § 2(15) of the Bankruptcy Act . . . courts of bankruptcy are
invested with such authority in equity as will enable them to exercise original juris-
diction in bankruptcy proceedings, including the power to 'make such orders, issue such
processs, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may
be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this act'. . . .But a proceeding
under § 77 is not an ordinary proceeding in bankruptcy. It is a special proceeding which
seeks only to bring about a reorganization, if a satisfactory plan to that end can be
devised. And to prevent the attainment of that object is to defeat the very end the
accomplishment of which was the sole aim of the section, and thereby to render its
provisions futile." 294 U. S. 648, 676, 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 606 (1935).
26294 U. S. 648, 676, 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 606 (1935).
2749 STAT. 911 (1935), 11 U. S. C. A. 205a (1937). See atso Thompson v. Terminal
Shares, 104 F. 2d 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), discussed in note 55 infra.2 SNote 49 YALE L. J. 568 (1940). .Cf. Thomas v. Winslow, 11 F. Supp. 839 (W. D.
N. Y. 1935) for the furthest extension of the property concept. Here the right of a
debtor to the return of wrongfully taken money was called "property" within the
[Vol. 33
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Certainly some of the language in the Rock Island case seems indicative of
an intention to broaden and liberalize the reorganization court's power to
issue process extra-territorially. 29
Judges and text-writers have said for centuries that equity acts in personam.
If this is true, how can an extra-territorial injunction be explained unless
it is admitted that it is but a form of in personam process? It is impossible
to distinguish, on principle at least, between an injunction and another form
of process such as a summons going outside the territorial boundaries of the
district.
As yet the Supreme Court has not decided whether in personam process
in a plenary suit can be served outside the territorial limits of the judicial
district. Although the question has been twice raised, the answer has been
postponed. In the Rock Island case the Court said:
"It may be that in an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding the issue of an
injunction in the circumstances here presented would not be sustained.
As to that it is not necessary to express an opinion."30
Later in Williams v. Austrian:
"Allowing the primary court to hear these suits will not change this
situation, if it is true that the process of a reorganization court does not
run nationwide in plenary cases."3' 1
Undoubtedly, extra-territorial service of process would be constitutional.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in Robertson v. Railroad Labor Board, wrote:
"Congress has power . . . to provide that the process of every district
court shall run into every part of the United States."3 2
IV. REASONS FOR NATION-WIDE PROCESS
The legal basis for extra-territorial service of process is clear. It is not
a question of legal power but a question of policy.3 3 In essence, the problem
meaning of § 77b in order to bring an obviously plenary action within the scope of
the court's summary jurisdiction.29
"The usefulness of the section would bke greatly minimized and in some instances
destroyed if that court were powerless to seld its process into any State when necessary
to effectuate the purposes of the law." 294 U. S. 648, 683, 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 609 (1935).30294 U. S. 648, 676, 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 606 (1935).
31331 U. S. 642, 660, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443, 1452 (1947).
32268 U. S. 619, 622, 45 Sup. Ct. 621, 622 (1925), citing Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet.
300, 328 (U. S. 1838); United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U. S. 569, 604 (1878);
see also United States v. Congress Construction Co., 222 U. S. 199, 203, 32 Sup. Ct 44,
46 (1911) ; First National Bank of Canton v. Williams, 252 U. S. 504, 510, 40 Sup. Ct.
372, 373 (1920); Continental Ill. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
R.R. Co., 294 U. S. 648, 683, 55 Sup. Ct. 595, 609 (1935).33Keeffe and Cotter, Service of Process in Suits Against Directors: A Barrier to
Justice, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 74, 78 (1941).
1947]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
is this-is there sufficient need for such service to outweigh the policy
objections advanced?
The facts of the Standard Gas34 case vividly illustrate that a statutory inter-
pretation denying such service frustrates corporate reorganization. There,
the trustee was faced with the dilemma of prosecuting a claim for several
million dollars against fifty-six directors residing in ten different states. He
attempted to join all the directors in one suit in the reorganization court.
He was unsuccessful. The court held that out-of-state service of process on
the fifty-three non-resident directors was unauthorized. As a result, ten
separate suits in as many different states were necessary. Certainly, the
desirability of one rather than ten separate suits is not open to question.
Ancillary suits, resulting in excessive costs and long delays in the formu-
lation of a plan of reorganization, were largely responsible for the enactment
of Chapter X in 1938.85 Congress intended to provide a faster and cheaper
system of corporate reorganization.30
Before a plan of reorganization can be promulgated, the assets of the
debtor must be determined with a fair degree of accuracy.3 7 No "fair" plan
can be drawn where the inclusion or exclusion of several million dollars of
assets is still undecided. Reason and justice demand that this question be
decided as quickly and cheaply as possible. That one suit in one court rather
than ten suits in ten courts is more feasible is obvious.38 Certainly Chapter X
should not needlessly be interpreted to make reorganizations as inefficient
as they were under the old and unwieldy equity receivership method which
this Section was enacted to replace. Extra-territorial service of process is
the answer.
Text-writers and judges have based their policy objections to extra-
territorial process on the supposed hardships to defendants.3 9 The tenor of
the usual objection is that it would be inequitable to compel parties to come
into the reorganization court to defend suits brought by the trustee and
that in some cases it may be cheaper for them to suffer default judgments
34119 F. 2d 658 (C. C. A. 3d 1941).35See note 17 supra.3 6FINLETTER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 176 (1939).
3752 STAT. 879 (193.8), 11 U. S. C. A. 621 (1946).3 8
"It is . . . generally vital to the success of a reorganization that all the debtor's
property be included, that the continuation of the debtor's business be not unduly
hampered by dissipation of the property to particular creditors, or by the separate
administration of the estate in numerous forums." 6 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 585 (14th
Ed. 1947).
3 9 FINLETTER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTcY REORGANIZATION 175 (1939); Notes, 49
HARv. L. REv. 797, 801 (1936), 49 YALE L. J. 568, 573 (1940), 89 U. PA. L. REv. 960,
965 (1941).
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than to defend suits far from their residences. 40  However, it is hard to
engender sympathy for the fifty-six directors in the Standard Gas case, some
of whom were alleged to have used their control to profit themselves to the
damage of the corporation, along with the others who contributed thereto
by their negligence. The hardship, if any, would seem to be on the trustee
who is forced to journey to several states armed with voluminous corporate
records and a crowd of experts to interpret and explain them. Many of
the cases prosecuted by the trustee involve, as in the Standard Gas case,
claims for millions of dollars.41
It is hard to distinguish on principle between the reorganization of a
nation-wide corporation and a railroad. As has been pointed out:
"The requirement that all suits against railroads which are undergoing
reorganization must be brought in the reorganization court regardless
of the residence of the plaintiff would seem to impose equal hardship.
Yet no serious objections seem to have been made to it."' 4
Upon examination the supposed hardship to the defendant, against whom
a small claim is asserted, is more feared than actual. Extra-territorial service
of process need not be interpreted as mandatory. Where inconvenience to
the out-of-state defendant outweighs the benefits derived from centralized
administration and the elimination of ancillary proceedings, such process
need not issue.43 Section 118 of Chapter X provides:
"The judge may transfer a proceeding under this chapter to a court of
bankruptcy in any-other district, regardless of the location of the prin-
cipal assets of the debtor or its principal place of business, if the interests
of the parties will be best served by such transfer. '44
As the law is interpreted today there is no clear cut definition of juris-
diction.4 Where jurisdiction exists is unpredictable. Litigation involving
solely jurisdictional questions abounds, delaying both the prosecution of
claims and completed reorganizations. 46 The reorganization court determines
40Note, 49 YALE L. J. 568, 573 (1940).41Williams v. Austrian, 331 U. S. 642, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443 (1947) ($39,000,000);
Continental Ill. National Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 294 U. S.
648, 55 Sup. Ct. 595 (1935) (sale of $56,100,000 collateral to pay a debt of $17,800,000
enjoined) ; Thompson v. Terminal Shares, 104 F. 2d 1 (C. C. A. 8th 1939) ($3,200,000).42Note, 49 YALE L. J. 568, 573 (1940), citing Gerdes, Jurisdiction of the Court in
Proceedings under Section. 77B, 4 BROOKLYN L. REv. 237, 288 (1935) and "cases there
cited.43See note 38 supra.
4452 STAT. 885 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 518 (1946).45Williams v. Austrian, 331 U. S. 642, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443 (1947); 52 STAT. 843 (1938),
11 U. S.C. A. § Ila (15) (Supp. 1946); 52 STAT. 854 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 46b
(Supp. 1946).
46Williams v. Austrian, 331 U. S. 642, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443 (1947); In re Eastern
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whether a summary or plenary suit is appropriate by sending the defendant
notice of the pending suit. The defendant then must answer and convince
the court that his claim is substantial, otherwise the suit proceeds in a sum-
mary manner.47. This determination alone often involves a consideration of
the merits of the claim. Thus, the defendant is forced to litigate his claim,
superficially at least, before he establishes a right to a plenary suit in his
home district. Who will argue that this procedure is more expeditious than
determining the entire controversy in the first instance in the primary
court? Extra-territorial process issuable by the primary court would elimi-
nate appeals from jurisdictional determinations and expedite corporate
reorganizations.
The courts, apparently recognizing the need for extra-territorial service,
have tortured the property concept to support summary jurisdiction, in their
desire to avoid the necessity of separate and distinct plenary suits. 48  Such
intellectual dishonesty leads to greater confusion with each use of a device
of this nature.
The appearance of extra-territorial process on the stage of bankruptcy
would create somewhat less interest than the appearance of an inhabitant
of Mars. Such process is not unknown. As one commentator has said:
"Whenever Congress has felt that there was good reason to permit the
service of process elsewhere it has by special enactment done so. Three
outstanding examples of the exercise of this power of Congress are the
Interpleader Act, the Securities and Exchange Act, and the 1936 amend-
ment to the federal venue statute. And in addition to these statutes
there are many others." 49
V. NATION-WIDE PROCESS IN LIQUIDATING BANKRUPTCY
The same practical considerations which demand extra-territorial service
of process in reorganization proceedings are equally applicable to liquidating
bankruptcy. Whatever adds to or preserves the assets available for dis-
tribution to creditors is desirable. Fewer ancillary suits in fewer courts,
with the resultant decrease in liquidation expenses, add to the amount avail-
able for the liquidating dividend.
Bankers Corporation, CCH BANxR. LAw SERV. (3d ed.) f1 53,967 (D. C. N. J. 1942);
Clarke v. Fitch, CCH BANER. LAW SERV. (3d ed.) 11 53,805 (S. D. N. Y. 1942);
In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., 119 F. 2d 658 (C. C. A. 3d 1941) ; Thompson v.
Terminal Shares, 104 F. 2d 1 (C. C. A. 8th 1939).47Gerdes, Jurisdiction of the Court in Proceedings Under Section 77B, 4 BRooKaYN
L. Rpv. 237, 268 (195).4SSee supra note 28.
49Keeffe and Cotter, Service of Process in Suits Against Directors: A Barrier to
Justice, 27 CORNELL L. Q. 74, 78 (1941).
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Admittedly there is more serious statutory objection to extra-territorial
service of process in liquidating bankruptcy than in reorganization proceed-
ings. Section 23b, expressly excluded from the provision of the reorganiza-
tion chapter, is applicable in liquidating bankruptcy. This section provides:
"b. Suits by the receiver and the trustee shall be brought or prose-
cuted only in the courts where the bankrupt might have brought or
prosecuted them if proceedings under this Act had not been instituted,
unless by consent of the defendant, except as provided in sections 60,
67, and 70 of this Act."' 0
This section on the surface has the effect of limiting the liquidating trustee
to the' state courts, since suits may be brought only where the bankrupt
might have brought or prosecuted them. However, the exceptions provided
for rob this section of much of its vitality. The three exceptions are (1)
avoiding preferences (Section 60), (2) avoiding lien attachments (Sec-
tion 67), and (3) avoiding fraudulent conveyances (Section 70). It is
difficult, to imagine any considerable volume of litigation by trustees in
bankruptcy not coming within one of these three exceptions.
It is interesting to note that for the purposes of these three exceptions
the statute provides:
"... where plenary proceedings are necessary, any State court which
would have had jurisdiction if bankruptcy had not intervened and any
court of bankruptcy shall have concurrent jurisdiction." 51  (Italics
added.)
A literal reading of the provision "any court of bankruptcy" would vest in
the liquidation court jurisdiction of plenary suits. This section was construed
in Bardes v. Hawarden Bank02 as merely eliminating any venue objection
which might be raised by a defendant when sued in a federal court. The
word any has been needlessly disregarded. Furthermore, the validity of this
case seems open to question today as a result of the Williams v. Austrian
decision. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the Austrian case, wrote:
"Indeed, the foundation of the decision of the court below [affirmed
in the majority opinion] and of the argument at the bar of this Court
is the claim that the construction placed on the jurisdictional Act of
1898 by the Bardes and Schumacher cases was erroneous and to be
rejected without compunction. . .. "53
5052 STAT. 854 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 46b (Supp. 1946).
5152 STAT. 870 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 96b (1943) ; 52 STAT. 878 (1938), 11 U. S.
C. A. § 107e (Supp. 1946); 52 STAT. 882 (1938), 11 U. S. C. A. § 110e (Supp. 1946).52178 U. S. 524, 20 Sup. Ct. 1000 (1900).
53331 U. S. 642, 668, 67 Sup. Ct. 1443, 1456 (1947).
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The problem of bankruptcy jurisdiction is no different than that discussed
by Matthew Bacon when he said:
"By an equitable Construction, a Case not within the Letter of a Statute
is sometimes holden to be within the Meaning, because it is within the
Mischief for which a Remedy is provided. The Reason for such Con-
struction is that the Law-maker could not set down every Case in ex-
press Terms. In order to form a right Judgment whether a Case be
within the Equity of a Statute, it is a good Way to suppose the Law-
maker present; and that you have asked him this Question, Did you
intend to comprehend this. Case? Then you must give yourself such
Answer as you imagine he being an upright Man, would have given.
If this be, that he did mean to comprehend it, you may safely hold the
Case to be within the Equity of the Statute: For while you do no more
than he would have done, you do not act contrary to the Statute, but
in Conformity thereto.
'54
CONCLUSION
As long as our present economic system continues, the need for a bankrupt-
cy and reorganization procedure will exist. It is businesses and businessmen
that go bankrupt, not the courts. The bankruptcy procedure, theref6re, must
fulfill the needs of the business world. There is no room in such a system
for a slavish adherence to outmoded legal doctrines.
Congress with complete power over bankruptcies has delegated to the
federal courts the responsibility of supervising the machinery it has provided
in the Bankruptcy Act. Congress intended an efficient machine. Yet the
courts, refusing to recognize the mandate of Congress, hiave held to the
ancient doctrine of process only within their territorial boundaries and need-
lessly give the Act a narrow interpretation.65 A broad interpretation allow-
ing extra-territorial service of process where expedient would fulfill a prac-
tical need that exists for a more efficient system of reorganization and
bankruptcy. A New York court summarized our position succinctly:
"Such a construction ought to be put upon a statute as will best answer
the intention which the makers had in view, for qui haeret in litera,
haeret in cortce."5 6
54BACON's ABRIDGMENT *649.55No better example of such blind adherence can be found than Thompson v. Termi-
nal Shares, 104 F. 2d 1 (C. C. A. 8th 1939). Congress had amended § 77 to provide,
"Process of the court shall extend to and be valid when served in any judicial district."
Here, a reorganization trustee, in an in personam action, sought to set aside four
allegedly invalid contracts of the debtor. The defendants, non-residents, were served
with process beyond the territorial limits of the reorganization court. The court refused
to uphold such service, in spite of the Rock Island case. The main reason given for
the holding was § 23, which the court felt prohibited extra-territorial service of process
in plenary suits. The amendment to § 77 was thought to add nothing to the Rock Island
case, which the court casually explained on the basis of the exclusive jurisdiction over
the debtor's property, wherever located.56Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N. Y. 506, 510, 22 N. E. 188, 189 (1890).
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